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Io..
DEINTION -- HOW MUCHT DOES STREE'T RAITLWAY INCLUDE ?
Tb -%Mow..,
In order to define what is meant by street railway as
it pertains to this subject it is first necessary to inquire
what is meant by a street. This might be dismissed sum-
marily by saying it is a public road or way in a city, town
or village.(Elliot on Roads and Streets12) If this were
adopted the question would immediately suggest itself are
street and highway convertible terms. It requires no
amount of reason to arrive at the conclusion that though all
streets are highways, still all highways are hot necessary
streets. (24 Am.& Ing.Encyolo.Lawp.2) Even having arrived
at this we are still unable to define accurately and dis-
tinguishingly the respective terms9  We are obliged to
thumb the yellow leaves and faded pages of the legacies of
our Roman and Teutonic ancestors as they have been handed
down, and commented upon by our more immediate forefathers
in the numerous volumes of legal literature, which by their
perseverance and adaptability to. the study of jurisprudence
the English bench and bar have resurrected from the musty
ruins of the past.
The reader will not of course eipect an historical die-
2oussion of what these terms have meant in the different ages
of progress and invention from the time when Semiramis made
her subjocts in Nineveh neighbors to those of Busa or Perseop-
ohls by means of those lasting thoroughfares that have stood
incorrigible to the ever nagging hand of time ; nor will it
be my purpose to treat of those ways, the building of which
would have made the Roman famous did he never think of law,
literature nor theology. It is enough to borrow from
their descended stores such appellations and oonceptions
as other nations have become possessed# and by them deliver-
ed to their migrating ohildren to-diffuse and establish
throughout the Mew World to which they fled, here to found
and build up a new political and social system with such
modifications as were consonant with their utilitarian and
democratic ideas, tempered by the adversities of a trackless,
boundless forest before them; hidden beneath whose boughs
was the treacherous and murderous savage, 'and behind them
rolled the broad expansive waste of the Atlantic. With
such surroundings it is but reasonable shat those first set-
tlers should appropriate whatever was useful of the laws
and improvements they but lately left behind them. They
built their roads as their fathers had built tiMm, and
designated them according to the oldfrt s ; and at the
present time in the State of Louisiana the law, governing
roads and ways is still quite similar to the old Roman.
(Code of Louisiana,SS.70-70)
3Bacon said In his day there were three kinds of ways,
*(I) 'A footway called in Latingtier ; (2) A pack and prime-
way whioh is both a horse and footway called in Latin actus ;
(3) A oartway called in Latin via or adttU which contains
the other two as well as a cartway, and Is called in Latin
vaRega if it be common to all men and communis strata if
it belong only to some town or private person.(Bacon's Abr.,
Highways) It is with this last class that we will have to
deal and this-disposes of them as far as pertains to use
in the early treatises, but as regards the element of posses-
sion Justinian divided all property, into recommunes, as the
sea and air whioh cannot be appropriated by any particular
individuals ; roe pbi.oae, things which belong to the state,
as the state lands (ager publicus) navigable riveris trq -a,.
etc*i res universitatis, things which belong to aggrogate
bodies as corporations ; res Prvats, things which belong to
individuals ; res nullius, things which no one could own,
as wild animals, etc.(Sander's Inst. of Justinian,56.)
Savigny adopts much the same division with the further re-
mark that all re publioae and communes are incapable of
being possessed. (Savigny on Posseson(Perry's ed1)85)
Dornat also includes highways in his classification of
things public, the use of which is common to all particular
persons, but adds that it is the sovereign that regulates
the Use of them, ( I Dormat's Civil Law,(Oush.ed.1850)15O
art.116.) Prom these classifications it is seen we must
4draw our modern street and highway from the via regia and
Oommounisstratarof Bacon, and the re p ubloaeres univer-
sitatis and r privAta~ e of Justinian, and endeavor to
distinguish so far as is deemed necessary for a proper con-
Sideration of the subject at hand. These definitions would
indeed seem vague to us did we not look at them with a modern
city and rural district before our eyes ; but aside from
this all of them convey the idea of their being ",used for
public purposes by the public indiscriminately, with the
slight variation owing to the dignity conferred upon the one
by its use and appellation-- via rea. This term evidently
included urban and rural roads, or as we now designate them
streets and highways.
Since we have learned at the outset that all streets are
highways and that all highways are not necessarily streets,
then highways must be a general term of which street is a
division, and since we seldom find the term used outside
of towns and cities it must by common consent be confined to
them. However, as we progress in this consideration we
will learn that as regards its connection with railways it
will often be found an important and difficult question to
determine whether a thoroughfare is a road or a street, and
whether the track laid thereon is a street railway or an
ordinary railroad.
If now we conclude that a street is a public way in a
city or town we might at first infer that a street railway
5was a railway ereoted In a street. This would be inor-
root, for we find nearly all our great ol ties pproached
through their streets and avenues by the great coimneroial,
and trunk lines of the continent, while, clearly no one
would think of classifying the Pennsylvania# or the New York
Oentral Railroads with street railways. To distinguish those
it might be suggested that the latter carry only passengers
within city limits, while the former carry freight and passen-
gers -beyond the city limits.1  This seems to be the ground
upon which the majority of the courts draw the distinction,
but it is still a mooted question in many of the states in
the construction of statutes in which the term "railroad' is
found.2
If this is not the means by which we are to distinguish
them then we must look to something olsep and the next would;
naturally be the motive power. Steam is now used as a traat-
or in both railways and railroads ; and even in the city has
superseded the horse and cable car, which so lately superseded
the old-fashioned stage coach and omnibus, that for so many
centuries served the purposes of travel. The first railroad
was nothing but an improved stage coach and to the old nomen-
alature we sti l aling, even though inventions and the prog-
I Thompson-Houston Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 67.
2 In Birmingham &c. Ry. Co. v. Jacobs, 92 Ala. 200, a rail-
road, organised under an act of the Legislature providing for
street railways, running beyond the corporate limits of any
city or town t through counties is not a street railway with-
in the meaning of the Constitution and pro visions of the Code.
Gretter difficulty has been found to describe each in Pennsyl-
vania. See Hestonvill &c. Ry. Co. Y. Phila., 89 Pa. St. 210;
Gyger v. Phila. &o. Ry. Co. 139 Pa. St. 96# and Potts et al.
v. Quaker City Elev. Ry. Co. 161 Pa. St. 402 (1894).
6roe of arte and sciences have greatly affected the meaning
of the words. "*Road' is now used to mean a *railroad*# but
unttl the thing was made or seen even the most fertile bmag-
ination of a century ago oould not have pictured It from the
use of the word. So we oall the enolosure in which passen-
gers travel on a railroad a 'coach' but it Is more like a
house than a ooaoh, and is less like a coach than are several
other vehioleo which are rarely if ever salled ocoaohes.
In the rapid strides of progress and invention It Is but
natural that people should still retain the old notion that a
street railway was one operated by horses or some other sam-
1lar motor. Ilectricity and the cable were accepted will-
ingly as an Improvement ; but the bustle of the steam is Still
repugnant as not being a. use of the street within the contemi-
plation of the people at the time the street was laid out,
and therefore not a proper use of the street. Out of the
contention has grown the endless litigation which will be
treated in the remainder of this work. We find under the law
of Illinois and act which gives cities councils authority to
license 'hackmen, omnibus drivers and all others pursuing
like occupations' embraces street cars ; (Allerton v. City of
Chicago, 9 Bin. (u.s.) 552.) while again in Pennsylvania it wa
held that an act fixing rates for tolls for 'every carriage,
wagon or other wheeled vehicle of whatever description" did
not include street cars ; (Monongahela Bridg# Co. v. Ry. Co.
28 A. & E. Ry. oas. 30) and again in New York the provisions
of I N. Y. R.. 6959, entitled *Of the law of the road and the
7regltion.... -public stages are not applicable to street rail-
ways. -(Whiftker v. Eighth Ave. Ry. 0o. 51 N.Y. 295).
Again we find in Pennsylvania another apparent conflict
when the Supreme Court of that State decides that sec. 4,
art. 17 of the Constitution, providing that "no railroad,
eanal or other corporation x x % shall consolidate x x x with,
or lease or purchase the works or franchises of, or in any way
control, any other railroad or canal corporation owning Z x X
a parallel or competing line" is not applioable to street rail.
way companies. (Gyger v. Ry. o.139 Pa. St. 96). And. in
Ry. Co. v. City of Pittsburg (104 Pa. St. 522 ; 17 A. & E.
Ry. Co. 43) the *curt held that the real estate of a street
passenger railway is within the meaning and spirit of an act
making the real estate of "railroads' liable to taxation.
From these two oases arose the Potts case (161 Pa. St. 402).
owing to the doubt, into which the court had driven them,
whether they should incorporate their elevated railroad under
the general railroad law, or under the street railway law.
They chose the former and the court said "the appellant Is
not a street passenger railroad company and cannot acquire
the rights and franchises of such company without incorpor.-
tion under our s ~e railroad4 la.". The Northeastern .., -
vated Railway Company believed they could operate their road
it incorporated under the street railway laws, but what the
court apparently decided in the Potts case, they again speak-
ing through the same Justice Williams in Com. v. N. E. Elev.
Ry. Co. (161 Pa. St. 411) held that, 'even if it had been in-
corporated as a street passenger railroad It could not have
8acquired thereby the right to build an elevated street rail-
road, for there is no provision in our street. railroad laws
that authorize such a structure, or that contemplate any other
than surface lines.'
From these litigations in one state alone it is obvious
that the task is not easily met with in distinguishing the
one from the other. The last case seems to add one distin-
guishing feature to street railways in that State, and that £5
it must be a surface road, or in other words built upon the
highway. Highways are established to accommodate the public
in traveling from place to place. Prom time immemorial,
prior to the discovery of steam they were for the common use
of every citizen, by any means of locomotion he chose to elect
They were not used by one person in any way which was not
open to all. The railroad does not fall within the, soope of
such uses. (Lewis Em. Domain s.fll) It requires a perma-
nent structure in the street, the use of which is private and
exclusive.
Street railways are in. a general sense, highways, but
they are not, in a strict sense, public ways, since their
owners possess a private proprietary right in the franchise 0
and such railways are operated for private gain not primarily
for the. public benefit. (Elliott Roads & Streets, 560).
A railroad is for the use or the universal public in the trans
portation of all persons, baggage and other freight ; (20 Ore.
67) while the New York Courts after some debate have arrived
at the conclusion that the difference between a steam and a
9horse railway is one of degree ; (Hare Const. Law, p.366.)
the degree they do not give nor do text writers offer to help
them out. The Supreme Court of Oregon defines a street rail-
way to be a railroad "dedicatcd to the more limited use
of the local public for the more transient transportation
of persons only and within limits of a city". (20 Ore.67.)
Were the learned justice not to particular to limit it to
roads within a olty his definition would be quite applicable
even to the more densely populated Eastern portion of the
Union, but in the coal fields of the Lackamanna, and Wyoming
Valleys of Pennsylvania we find an electric passenger rail-
way system stretching over territory fully fifty miles in
length and from five to ten miles wide, operated in the streets
and highways through and between the towns located therein,
and engaged solely in carrying local passengers to and from
the intermediate points along the lines ; and no one would
question for a moment but this is a street railway.
We must conclude then that the distinctive and essential
feature of a street railwray, considered in relation to other
railroads is that it is a railway for the transportation of
passengers, and not of freight ; that the difference consists
in their use, and not in the motive power ; (Williams vs.Rail-
way Co.,41 ?ed.Rep.5B56.) and that street railway now means
cable, electric, horse and sometimes steam.
- - - -- - -- --- - m -- -- - - - - - - -- -- -- a --- --004.0
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RIGHT TO OCCUPY STR}ETS AND HIGHWAYS.
Power of Legislature to Grant :-...
It 1s now such a well estbalished rule of :,aw in this
country as to be no longer open to debate that the legisla-
ture has absolute control over the streets ; and may, where
no private interests are involved or invaded, olose a highway
and relinquish altogether its use by the public, or it may
regulate such use, or restrict it to particular vehicles, or
to the use of a particular motive power. (People V. Kerr,
27 N.Y.I8 (1863) It may change one kind of a public uae
into another so long as the property continues to be devoted
to a public use.(Carli v.Stillwater Ry.Oo. &,Transfer Co.,
28 Minn.373 ; 3 A.& E. Ry.Cas.22S) The highway Is the
property of the people, not of a particular district, but of
the whole state ; who, constituting as they do the legitimate
sovereign, may dispose of it by their representatives and
at their pleasure.(Phil.v. Trenton Ry.Oo. 6 Whart.(Pa.)25.)
This power of disposition is even extended to cases
where the fee of the streets is in the municipal corporation.
Whether the corporation be the owner of' the fee of the
street in trust for the public, or whether it be merely the
trustee of' the streets and highways as such, irrespective of'
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any title to'the..soil, it has the power to authorize their
appropriation to all such uses as are conducive to the public
good, and do not interfere with the complete and unrestricted
use as~highways; and in doing so Is not obliged to eonfine it-
self to such uses as have already been permitted.(Milhau v.
Sharp 15 Barb.206 (1853).)
In New York where by law when a public street is laid
out or dedicated, the fee in the soil becomes vested in the
city, it has been held that the legislature might authorize
the construction of a horse railway in a street and that
neither the city nor the owners of lots were entitled to com-
pensation. The city was not entitled, because, though it
held the fee, it held it in trust for the use of all the
people of the state and not as corporate or municipal
property ; and the land having been originally acquired under
the right of eminent domain, and the trust being publici uria
it was under the unqualified control of the legislature and
any appropriation of it to public use by legislative authori-
ty could not be regarded as an appropriation of the private
property of the city.(Cooley Const.Lim.6th Ed.pp.678-9,and
authorities cited thereunder.) It is indispensable to the
validity of a direct legislative grant that in every instance
the use shlould be public, for highways are held in trust for
the public purposes and no other. (glliott ,Roads & Streets
p.565. ) Roads and streets are never held for permanent private
purposes. (Smith v. City of Leavenworth 15 Kan.81) In grant-
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ing a right, to use a highway for a street railway the legisla-
ture makes that lawful which but for the grant, would be un-
lawful# for no citizen has a right to use :..highway in any
other than the usual modes, except where the legislature
authorizes him to do so.( Angel on Highways, S. q3)
But there is conflict in the decided cases upon the ques-
tion of the power of the legislature to grant an exclusive
right to a street railway to occupy and use a street., This
is the consequence of the fallacy that has misled so many of
our courts, They seem to have been carried away with the
idea that a railroad is but an improved highway. It is no
more an improved highway than is a canal and no one would
question for a moment the Justice or propriety of a street
being given up to a canal. Lewis(Em.Dom.s.lll) says : "to
hold that a railroad is one of the proper and legitimate uses
of a street leads to the absurd consequence that a street
might be filled with parallel tracks which would practically
exclude all ordinary travel and still be devoted to the ordi-
nary uses of the highway."
His remark is consonant with sound reason and discretion;
and since it is settled with but few exceptions (Jersey City
v~do.20 N.J. Eq. 61 (1869),) that the power to control the
streets is in the legislature and that this power may be di-
rectly exercised or may be delegated to a municipality it
would be-anticipating the work of the next part of this
article to discuss the rights of a monopoly on the streets;
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for it would lead to the necessity of defining where the
rights of the public end and those of the abutting owners
begin before disposing of the
Power of Municipality to Grant :G----
If the power of the legislature to regulate the control
of streets is conceded to be supreme and absolute it must
follow as a necessary conclusion, that the power of the munic-
ipality Is that of agent, if it has any power at all. That
it has a certain interest in the care and management of its
own streets, aside from that of thie convenience of travel
no on* will dispute. How far this oontrol extends or how far
it should extend is the question to be answered here.
It is the usual and ordinary method for a legislature to
leave to the municipality the acceptance and ratification of
the rights delegated b-Jy the legislature in their charter to
the railway corporation, by some act or ordinance in accord-
ance with the usual methods of performing the functions of
city government. How far and to what extent this acceptance
or reJection may be modified is generally stated to depend on
the charter of the municipality.(Dillon,Mun.Oorp.s.658; 4th ed.)
The Supreme Court of North Carolina (Asheville v. Ry.Co. 19
S.L. 697) held that the charter of a street railway company,
granting to it certain pow ers and privileges, and 'such other
privileges as may be granted by the municipa! authorities"
gives the ci ty no new power, but merely authorizes it to ex-
ercise such power as it has under its charter for the further-
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anoe of the objects of the railway. This seems to be the
recognized opinion of the courts of this country and it has
been asserted that the consent of a city to construct a raiV
way without express legislative authority would be of no avail
as a Justification ofor occupying city streets.(Potts Case,
11P.St. 396(1894). )
Since the municipality cannot authorize the erection of
railways in its streets and is an agent of the legislature,
if it authorizes such functions at all it must be an agent to
the extent of performing such legislative functions as are
expressly granted to it by the legislature. That it has the
right to exercise the police power is too well settled by the
line of decision following the Ilayghter oae a (16 Wall.
36). Upon this right which has been thus preserved to it
tahe municipality has often imposed conditions upon the rail-
way companies which must be complied with and which the.
courts will interpose o enforce. (City of Alleshany v.Ry.Oo.
159 Pa.St.411.) No one would venture to assert under omne
maJue in se continet minus that all conditions would be en-
forced. The city council might impose conditions in contra-
vention to all law and the established precedents, or against
the fundamental principle of the purity of the administration
of public affairs for the public benefit. Such conditions
clearly would be an abuse of, or transcend the discretion
given them, and I have no hesitancy in saying would be declar-
ed void and of no force or ef'fect by any court to whom they
15
appealed for aid.
The rule then seems to be that when a regulation is pro-
scribed by the legislature itself, the courts can do no more
than ascertain whether or not any constitutional provision is
violated, and if they find that no constitutional right has
been invaded, the statute must be upheld. Where the regula-
tion is prescribed by a municipal corporation the field of
Judicial duty is much larger, for the courts must ascertain
whether there is a constitutional statute authorizing the act
of the municipality, whether the act is within the scope of
the statute, and is performed in the mode prescribed and whe-
whether the regulation is a reasonable one. To this extent
the municipality has power to regulate the use and occupancy
of its streets so that there are few instances in which the
company HasSuchRight. .
Though there have been numerous instances where the rail-
way company have sought to enforce their rights to occupy
the streets of a city without consent of the city as, where
under legislative authority to construct a railroad through a
city, the courts have in all cases respected the wishes and
authority of the municipality to regulate the control and the
use o±f its own streets and given it the right to say what
streets shall be so used, or if any. To say that the rail-
way company has such a rijght from the general grant and
charter given it by the legislature would be giving to the
railway corporation an unlimited power of discretion and sales-
16
tion. In the language of Justice 1,i1Ier of the United
States Supreme Oourt in Edmunds v. Baltimore &c. Ry. Co.
(114 U.S. 456) "the assertion of the oxistence of such a
right is, to say the least somewhat novel. It is not known
to any member of this Court that any railroad company,
whether its cars are propelled by steam or horse power, has
ever claimed to use the streets of an incorporated city or
any part of them without express authority from some legis-'
lative body, or the authorities of the city government. It
would be a strange grant of power which, authorizing a rail-
road company to enter or even pass through a city, should
leave to the company the selection, not only of its route
into or through the city, but even the streets and highways
over which its tracks should be laid, subject only to its
own sense of its own convenience and that of the people of
the city."
Prom the language of the learned Justice this seems to
be the first case of this kind before the United States Su-
preme Court ; but on a little investigation numerous cases
will be found which have arisen in other jurisdiotions,
though almost unanimously in accordance with the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court. (235 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law
p. 1098 and notes).
do- dol
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III.
RIGHT$ OP OWNER80? ABUTTING PROPERTY TO COMPENSATION.
General Doctrine : 1.
In all cases whether the fee of the street is in the
public or in the adjoining owner the abutting property own-
er has attached to his property the easements of light# air
and access -- both ingress and egress. (Story Case, 90 N.Y
122). These rights are property and to impair or destroy
them is a taking. (Lewis Em. Doa. S. 123.) Conceding for
the present that there has been a taking of property by in-
terfering with these easements, it follows that there has
been a loss or, we must inquire can there be a loss without
such taking.
In considering the loss has been occasioned to adjoin-
ing owners by laying of railroads in streets ; and whether
such a loss constitutes a taking we should inquire, first,
whether a railroad is one of the ordinary and legitimate
uses for which highways and streets are established ; second
the right to compensation when the fee is in the adjoining
owner, and, thrd, the right to oompensation when the fee is
in the public. The answer to the first question has been
disposed of and has been answerod in the negative modified
to the extent dependent upon the character of the highway.
This then leads to the inquiry is there any difference
whether the fee of the street is in the public or in the
18
abutting owner# The weight of authority seems to be now
that there is no distinction between the rights of abutting
owners who own the fee of the street and those who do not.
The earlier line of cases gave damages to the owner of the
fee to the street but refused it where the fee was in the
public. This doctrine has been generally changed and the
cases in support of the change are too numerous to need ci-
tation.
Doctrine in New York :--
Inwthis State the law is peculiar and the right to re-
cover is still based upon the nature and extent of the ti-
tle of the abutting property owner together with the nature
of the new use of the street, If the new use of the street
is a horse car line and the abutter owns the fee to the mid-
die of the street the courts hold it to be a trespass ;
(Craig v. Rochester &c. Ry. Co. 39 N.Y. 40) but if a horse
car line is built in a street in which the abutter has only
an easement in the street-- he only owning fee to- the ex-
ternor line of the street, the courts hold there is no
trespass. (People v. Kerr, 27 N.Y. 188 ; ,Mahady v. Bushwiock
Ry. Co. 91 N. Y. 148.) Andrews Oh. J. in deciding the
last case cited says ;• "The Story Oase left untouched the
decision in People v. Kerr that a horse railroad construct
ed under legislative authority on the surface of a city
street, the fee of wh~ich was in the city, was not an unlaw-
ful interference with the rights of abutting owners, but was
19
a street use consistent with their rights therein." The
rule is the same if instead of a horse car line a steam suir-
face line should be erected. (Williams v. N.Y. Cent. R.R.
16 N. Y. 97, and Fobes v. R. W. & 0. R. R. Co. 121 N.Y.
5os).
But there is a decided difference in the elevated rail-
way cases. In these it makes no difference whether the
abutter owns the fee or an easement in the street, he is
still entitled to compensation. This was established in
the Story Case (90 N. Y. 122), but in this case Story deriv-
ed title to his lot from the city with a covenant in the
deed that the street "shall forever thereafter oontinue and
be for the free and common passage, and as public street$
and ways for the inhabitants and all others x x z in like
manner as the other streets of the same city now are or law-
fully ought to be*. Aside from this express covenant the
case is quite similar to the ordinary cases. This point
the Court dismissed by saying it was an easement appurte-
nant to his property and therefore property.
The trial Court found that the defendants intended to
construct a road upon a series of columns, about fifteen
inches square, fourteen feet high, placed five inches inside
the edge of the sidewalk and carrying girders from thirty-
three to thirty-nine inches deep, for the supporting of
cross ties for three sets of rails for a steam railroad.
The cars intended for this road, would when placed thereon,
20
have bodies eleven feet above the tracks pin running would
project two feet over the sidewalk on either side of the
street, 4nd would reach within nine feet of the plaintiff's
building. The defendant intended to run his trains as of-
ten as onoe in three minutes, and at a rate of speed as high
as eighteen miles an hour. On appeal a divided court --
four to three r-*found that the injunction prohibiting the
continuance of the road, which was asked for should be is-
sued ; but not until the defendant has had reasonable time
after the decision to acquire the plaintiff's property by
agreement, or by proceedings to condemn the same.
Four years later (1887) after the complexion of the
Court had been changed, the question was again taken to the
Court of Appeals in the Lahr Case (104 N.Y. 270), hoping to
have the questions decided in the Story Case re-mexamined.
But Ruger Oh. J. in delivering the opinion of the Court says;
"The doctrine of the Story Case, although pronounced by a
divided Oourt, must be considered as stare decisis upon all
questions involved therein# and as establishing the law,
as well for this Court as for the people of the State, when-
ever similar questions may be litigated, x x x We hold that
that the Story Case h~as definitely determined :
Wirst. That an elevated railroad, in the streets of
a city, operated by steam power and constructed as to form,
equipments and dimensions like that described in the Story
Case, is-a perversion of the use of the street from the pur-
21
poses originally designed for it and is a use which neither
the city authorities nor the legilature can legalize or
sanction, without providing compensation, for the injury
inflicted upon the property of abutting owners.
Second. That abutters upon a public street claiming
title to their premises by grant from the municipal author-
ities, which contains a covenant that a street to be laid
out in front of such property, shall forever thereafter con-
tinue for the free and common passage of, and as public
streets and ways for the inhabitants of said city, and all
others passing and returning through or by the same, in like
manner as the other streets of the same city now are or law-
fully ought to be, acquire and easement in the bed of the ,
street for ingress and egress to and from their premises,
and also for the free and uninterrupted passage and oiroula-
tion of light and air through, and over such streets for the
benefit of property situated thereon.
Third. That the ownership of such easement, is an in-
terest in real estate, constituting property within the
meaning of that term, as used in the Constitution of the
.State (Art. 1 3. 6), and requires compensation to be made
therefor before it can lawfully be taken from its owner,
for public use."
This case was decided ,ithout a dissenting opinion.
Thus it will be seen that so far as elevated railroads are
conoerned the question is definitely settled at least in
New York.
22
In Other Jurisdictions :---
It is now well settled by the great weight of author-
ity that, where the fee of the street is in the abutting
ownerp he may recover for the additional burden caused by
a railroad laid in the street. 1
But where the fee is in the public and the abutter has
only an easement in the street there is still a difference
of opinion as to his right of compensation. Since the
rights of access, air and light are property it is diffi-
oult to vindicate the opinion of some courts that the abut-
ter is not entitled to comrensation for any interference o
with, or infringement of these rights. They attempt to
Justify their position by stating that the construction and
operation of a horse railway on the public streets of a city,
by authority from the city government, is not such a new or
additional burden imposed upon the land as would entitle the
owner of the fee to compensation therefor (Texis &c. Co. v,
Rosedale, 64 Tex. 80 (1885) reviewing previous cases) and
that a change of motor power does not Increase the servitude
or impose an additional burden to the one already on the
street. (Patterson Ry. Co. v. eGrundy, 51 N.J.Eq. 213
(1893).) On horse railroads the Court observes : "The
words 'horse railroad track or tracks' used in the ordinance
1tillon Mun. Corp. 4th Ed. S. 7Q5 and notes in which is
contained an admirable collection of cases ; and in notes
to Lewis Em. Dora. 5. 115 will be found a collection of the
different statutory provisions throughout th~e different
states and cases which have arisen thereunder.
23
must bo taken as descriptive of the railroad to be construct-
ed and not of the motive power to be used. Railways in the
streets of cities, laid to conform with the grade of the
streets, and properly known as street surface railroads, had
by common usage been designated as horse railroads from the
fact that they were for a long time operated exclusively by
horses being attached thereto, and horse railroads and
street surface railroads have come to be convertible terms.'
The Suprome Court of Pennsylvania (Lockart v. Craig
St. Ry. Co. 139 Pa. St. 419) in recognizing the right of the
leg'slature and city authorities to authorize the building
of railways upon the streets of cities says " The necessam
ry and proper apparatus for moving them must be allowed to
follow as an incident, unless there is something illegal in
Its construction or use". mhother it would consider the
erection of poles and wires in the street in front of prop"
erty such an impairment of access as to be illegal in its
construction, is yet to be, determined.
The law is well settled that wherever these rights of
light, air, and access are either destroyed or diminished,
the abutter is entitled to compensation, but whether there
has been such an interference is in all cases a question
still left to the Jury to decide.
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TV.
MEASURE OF DAAIAGES.
Genral ---
The measure of damages depends upon the nature of the
now use of the street, and the extent of the abutter's ti-
tie. If he owns to the middle of the street then clearly
ho has an action for trespass.
But if ho owns to the exterior line of the street then
hit action is for the impairment of the plaintiff's ease-
ment. 'hat constitutes such impairment is well stated in
an opinion by 1inch J. in Drucker v. The Tcanhattan Ry. Coo
(106 N. Y. 14) "Smoke and gases, ashes and cinders affect
and impair the easement of air. The structure itself and
the passage of cars lessen the easement of light. The
drippings of oil and water and possibly the frequent col-
umns interfere -.;tith the convenience of access. These are
elements of damage even though the necessary concomitants
of the construction and operation of the road, and not the
product of negligence, for they abridge the land owner's
easement, and to that extent, at least are subjects for re-
dress in an action for damages". This is but another way
of stating the fourth proposition of' the 81tory Case as it
was approved in the Lahr Case : mThat the erection of an
elevated railroa~d, the use of which is intended to be perma-
nent, in a public street, and upon which cars are propelled
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by 6team engines, generating gas, steam and smoke, and dis-
tributing in the air cinders, dust, ashes and other noxious
and deleterious substances, and interrupting the free pass-
age of light and air to and from adjoining premisesp consti-
tutes a taking of the easement and its appropriation by the
ra ,lroad corporation, and rendering it liable to the abut,
ters for damages occasioned by such taking."
Again in the Newman Case (Newman v. M.E.Ry. Co. 118
N.Y. 618) the rule was laid doyn,and approved in Bohm Case
(129 N.Y. 576) that the increase of value resulting from
the growth of p ublic improvements, the construction of rail-
roads and improved moans of transit accrues to the public
benefit generally, and the general depreciation of property
consequent upon such improvements belongs to the property
owner and the railroad company are not entitled to the con-
sideration of that element in the ascertainment of the com-
pensation it must pay to the abutting proprietor. But the
special and peculiar damages which property receives from
the construction and operation of the road, and the location
of the stations are elements which enter largely into the
inquiry whether there is an injury or not, and the jury must
consider them and give them due weight in their verdict.
Prom this it will be seen that the rule is pretty set~-
tied in New York as to the elements that constitute damages
in case the user is that of an elevated railway, with the
possible exception of the loss of privacy. This is still
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an open question though it has been recognized as far as it
related to depreciation in rental value in Messengor v.
Railway Company (129 fl.Y. 522) as also in the same case was
the effect of noise on rental value. Such damages as noise
and vibration can only be considered in an action to doter-
mine past damages and cannot be taken into consideration in
estimating prospective damages in a proceeding for an in"
Junction. (Am. Bnk. INote Co. v. L.Y.E.Ry. Co. 129 .Y.252).
Surface Roads.:-.-
Even the courts of New York have refused to apply the
same rules to surface roads that Lhey do in estimating dam-
ages in elevated railroad cases. They hold that such are
"merely incidental or consequential injuries for which the
abut'ter cannot recover," since the public use is authorized
by law and not malu, in se and merely affects him by proxim-
ity and not by adjacency. But then the rights of access,
light and air constitute the principal values of such pr-operi
t. and it must be presumed that :then lots are sold the grant-
ees purchase them with a view to the advantage and honefits
which attach to them because of these asernents. If he
does the grantee acquires a right to the street in front of
the premises as a moans of access. (Dooly BlQCk v. Rapid
Transit Co. 9 Utah 31.)
It is a well recognized principle, that where a thing
not mal um in se is authorized to he done by a valid act of
the legislature, and it is perforned -,pith due care and skill
27
in strict Oonformity 1T'th the provisions of the act, its
performance cannot, by common law be made the ground of an
action however much they may be injured by it. (Penny v.
8.4E Ry. Co. 7 He & B. 660 ; City of Glasgow Ry. Co. v.
Hunter, L.R. 2 Sc. & D. 73). There are certain injuries
which are necessarily incident to the ownership of property
in towns or cities which directly impair the value of privatle
property, for which the law does not, and never has afford-
ed any relief. For instance, the building of a jail, po-
lice station or the like will generally cause a direot de-
preciation in the value of neighboring property, yet that is
clearly a case of damnm absque inJui.
In all cases to warrant a recovery it must appear that
there has been some direct physical disturbance of the right,
either public or private, which the plaintiff enjoys in con-
nection with his property and which gives to it an addition-
al value, and that by reason of such disturbance he has sus-
tained a speoial damage with respect to his property in ex-
cess of that sustained by the public generally. 
But in de-
termining whether there has been a direct physical disturb-
ance a cursory review of the cases cited herein will show
that two propositions have been directly passed upon and
laid down : First, that a railway in a city is not per s e
a nuisance or a purpresture ; and, Second, that the city
corporation has the power and right to authorize the use of
streets for that purpose. And also that the word "damage"
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as ordinarily used in statutes has been given a very broad
meaning and embraced more than physical invasions of propor-
ty. It is not restricted to cases where the owner is en-
titled to recover as for a tort at cornmon law. (Reardon
et al v. City of San Francisco, b6Cal. 01.) The lan-
guage is intended to cover all cases in which even in the
proper prosecution of a public work or purpose the right or
property of any person in a pecuniary way may be injurious-
ly affected. ((.C.& S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 470).
